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    Home»World»China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP?
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    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP?

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    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP?

    From the BRI and Pokhara airport investigations to Tibetan sensitivities and US-India rivalry, Beijing’s outreach to 20 RSP lawmakers marks a pragmatic shift in its Nepal strategy.

    Having closely monitored the political upheaval in Nepal following the Gen Z movement of September 8 and 9, 2025, from the very beginning, China is now stepping out of quiet diplomacy and appearing in active political contact. After the end of the monarchy, Beijing’s strategy of putting forward communist forces as reliable political partners could not succeed as expected because the unity of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) could not be sustained.

    Following the failure seen in unity and cooperation among communist parties, Beijing also tried to expand dialogue and relations with other political forces, including the Nepali Congress. However, after Nepal’s latest political change altered the power center itself, Beijing’s focus now appears to be centered towards the new ruling force, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP).

    Understanding Nepal’s future policies, security priorities, infrastructure development, and the direction of international relations by building direct access with the leadership of the new power has become a natural strategic interest for Beijing.

    After the RSP emerged as the largest political force with 182 seats in the House of Representatives Election, not only has Nepal’s political equation changed, but external powers also face a situation where they must review their ways and priorities of maintaining relations with Nepal. Expanding relations with the new political force operating the government with a clear majority in Parliament holds much greater meaning for China than a formal diplomatic exercise. Understanding Nepal’s future policies, security priorities, infrastructure development, and the direction of international relations by building direct access with the leadership of the new power has become a natural strategic interest for Beijing.

    Team of RSP MPs visiting China.

    The invitation given by the Communist Party of China (CPC) to 20 RSP MPs is a public sign of this changing priority. A parliamentary delegation led by General Secretary Bipin Kumar Acharya is visiting China starting November 15. The formal agenda of the visit includes exchange of experiences on good governance, economic development, public service delivery, institutional capacity enhancement, and political leadership. However, the political significance of this is not limited to that. It appears that China seeks to develop institutional relations with the new ruling party, convey its concerns, and ensure its access in Nepal’s changed power structure.

    For China, keeping the door for dialogue and cooperation open with whoever reaches the center of political power in Nepal is important. Therefore, expanding relations with the RSP can be understood as a practical adjustment in China’s Nepal policy.

    This closeness is not a relationship formed due to ideological similarity. There are major differences in political ideology, governance systems, and organizational structures between the RSP and the CPC. China is based on a single-party communist governance system, whereas the RSP is a party operating the government on the basis of multiparty competition, parliamentary democracy, and public mandate obtained through elections. However, in international relations, national interest and strategic necessity tend to be more decisive than ideological closeness. For China, keeping the door for dialogue and cooperation open with whoever reaches the center of political power in Nepal is important. Therefore, expanding relations with the RSP can be understood as a practical adjustment in China’s Nepal policy.

    Prime Minister Balendra Shah and Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming. File photo

    Against this backdrop are issues such as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, corruption investigations connected to the Pokhara International Airport, Tibetan refugees and the One-China policy, increasing contact by US officials, competition with India, development cooperation in border areas, security of Chinese citizens and investments, and Nepal’s political stability. Looking at all these issues merely as separate events fails to capture the true dimension of China’s interests. Behind the Chinese efforts to increase closeness with the RSP, these interconnected strategic interests appear active.

    The Prime Minister has instructed MPs not to limit the visit to sightseeing or formal meetings, but to identify possibilities for trade, technology, tourism, agricultural modernization, and development partnership.

    Before going on the visit to China, the RSP delegation held discussions and consultations with Party Chairman Rabi Lamichhane at his residence. Prior to that, in a meeting held with Prime Minister Balendra Shah at Singha Durbar, a message also came that the China visit should be advanced by linking it with Nepal’s national interests and development priorities. The Prime Minister has instructed MPs not to limit the visit to sightseeing or formal meetings, but to identify possibilities for trade, technology, tourism, agricultural modernization, and development partnership. Giving importance to the same visit at both the party leadership and government levels has made the new phase of RSP-China relations more meaningful.

    What China’s interest is, how the RSP understands it, and what benefit Nepal can take from it have now become important subjects. China expanding relations with the new ruling party does not mean that Nepal must change its foreign policy. Rather, a test has begun of how mature, balanced, and result-oriented the new government can make its relations with neighbors and global powers.

    1. Expanding reach to the new power center

    After the center of power changed in Nepal’s politics, China has also begun changing the scope of its political contacts. Following the end of the monarchy, Beijing had prioritized communist forces as long-term political partners in Nepal. The CPC had intensified party-to-party relations with Nepal’s leftist parties. China is believed to have shown goodwill towards the unity between the CPN-UML and the Maoists with the desire that a strong and stable government be formed in Nepal.

    After the party split and reached three separate political streams, China seems to have concluded that the strategy of maintaining its political reach in Nepal by relying on a single communist force would not be sufficient.

    However, due to internal power struggles within communist parties, clashes among leaders, and ruling interests, the unified NCP could not sustain for long. With the party splitting into three distinct political streams, China appears to have concluded that relying solely on a single communist force to maintain its political access in Nepal is inadequate. Thereafter, Beijing also increased dialogue and exchange of visits with the Nepali Congress and other political forces.

    Meeting between RSP Chairman and the Chinese Ambassador.

    With the emergence of the RSP, the political map for China in Nepal has changed once again. Parties that previously held influence in power and policymaking have weakened, while a party representing a new generation, a new political narrative, and a new public mandate has reached the center of power. In such a situation, it is not unnatural for China to seek to develop institutional relations with the new power while maintaining continuity with old relations.

    Even before the emergence of the RSP, China had invited party leaders on visits. However, those contacts at that time were focused more on understanding the new party and building initial relations. Following the arrest of Party Chairman Rabi Lamichhane, the RSP delegation that went to China under the leadership of Vice-Chairman Swarnim Wagle had to cut short its visit and return to Nepal. This time, after the party reached power, China has invited 20 members of the parliamentary party all at once. This is a political contact at a different level in a different context.

    *Breaking: The incident where the delegation held discussions and consultations with Lamichhane at the party chairman’s residence before leaving for the China visit shows that the party’s political leadership and parliamentary delegation have taken the China visit with high importance.*

    Dialogue held previously between CPC leaders and RSP leadership, meetings with the Chinese ambassador, and increased diplomatic activism after the formation of the new government also point to this. China has engaged in repeated dialogues with RSP Chairman Rabi Lamichhane. The incident where the delegation held discussions and consultations with Lamichhane at the party chairman’s residence before leaving for the China visit shows that the party’s political leadership and parliamentary delegation have taken the China visit with high importance.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP?

    Meeting between Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal and the Chinese Ambassador.

    The discussion with the chairman cannot be viewed merely as a routine formality. While it may be an institutional practice for a party’s parliamentary delegation to consult party leadership when going on a foreign visit, this consultation has become more meaningful due to the political backdrop of this visit and the priority given by China. Lamichhane is the key political decision-maker of the party. Although the RSP holds leadership in the government, the chairman’s role is decisive in the party’s political direction, organizational priorities, and long-term strategy. Naturally, his views are important regarding how to advance relations with China at the party level.

    The Prime Minister’s message also incorporated the matters of maintaining a non-aligned foreign policy and balanced relations with major neighbors such as India and China.

    On November 13, the delegation preparing for the China visit held discussions with Prime Minister Balendra Shah at Singha Durbar. The Prime Minister had instructed not to take the visit merely as a formal or touristic program, but to prioritize what benefits Nepal can draw from China’s experience in technology, trade, tourism, agricultural modernization, and economic development. The Prime Minister’s message also incorporated the matters of maintaining a non-aligned foreign policy and balanced relations with major neighbors such as India and China.

    According to an MP who participated in the discussion with the Prime Minister, Balen had suggested proceeding according to Nepal’s non-aligned foreign policy and talking by centering Nepal’s development potential located between the two major neighbors. This directive of the Prime Minister shows an effort to link relations with China not just to political closeness, but to economic benefits and national interests.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP? (2)

    Nepali and Chinese officials at the anniversary ceremony of diplomatic relations.

    RSP Chief Whip Kabindra Burlakoti, quoting the Prime Minister’s message, had stated that instead of limiting the visit to sightseeing, it should focus on matters from which Nepal can benefit in trade, technology, tourism, and agricultural modernization. This statement clarifies the government’s official expectations. Studying China’s development experience is one aspect; making plans to utilize it according to Nepal’s needs is another aspect. If attention is not paid to the second aspect, the visit may remain limited to a report and formal exchange of experiences.

    The delegation visiting China had also discussed the impending visit with Chairman Lamichhane. Consultation with the party chairman has linked the visit to the party’s institutional priorities. Discussions with the Prime Minister have linked it to the government’s development and diplomatic priorities. Thus, conveying messages from both the party leadership and government levels on the same visit is a sign of the increasing importance of RSP-China relations.

    One of the major reasons for China expanding relations with the RSP is to ensure access to Nepal’s new political power center. By being able to maintain direct relations with the party leading the government, China can gain preliminary information regarding Nepal’s future policies, development priorities, security perspectives, and the direction of international relations. This helps keep doors of political contact open even if the government and leadership change in the future.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP? (3)

    Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming discussing infrastructure development, investment, and bilateral cooperation between Nepal and China with Infrastructure Development Minister Sunil Lamsal.

    An important characteristic of Chinese diplomacy is the ability to expand direct relations with political parties according to changing political circumstances and adjust the means and priorities of relations. Access to the RSP, which has become Nepal’s new political power center, can become a medium for Beijing to understand Nepal’s future policy direction, maintain strategic trust, learn the RSP’s priorities, and present its own concerns in a timely manner.

    However, understanding such contact merely as evidence of expanding Chinese influence would also be incomplete. Exchange of international relations and experiences among political parties is part of democratic practice. Nepal’s parties have maintained relations with political parties in India, China, the US, and other countries. The question is not whether to maintain relations, but how to conduct them within national interest, transparency, and institutional propriety.

    It is not appropriate to understand an individual’s personal or professional relations in the same sense as policy decisions of the state.

    In the historical context where China has been expanding its contact network along with political changes, Dr. Kalyanraj Sharma, who had maintained close relations with China from the Nepali side, was appointed as the Chinese ambassador. This appointment was made from the Nepali side. This shows that the history of political closeness and diplomatic contact in relations with China is long. However, it is not appropriate to understand an individual’s personal or professional relations in the same sense as policy decisions of the state.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP? (4)

    Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming discussing border security, internal security, and Nepal-China security cooperation with Home Minister Sudhan Gurung.

    According to former ambassador and diplomat Dr. Shambhuram Simkhada, Nepal must conduct its diplomacy by understanding the changing global geopolitical situation. He says, “Nepal must conduct its diplomacy by understanding the current changing global geopolitical situation. Keeping doors of dialogue open with major powers like India, China, and the US is our necessity. It is not appropriate to draw final conclusions about the government’s foreign policy based on a single event. The evaluation of foreign policy should be based on long-term conduct and the results obtained from it. In diplomacy, protocol must be followed according to national interests, but flexibility and the capacity for dialogue according to circumstances are also necessary.”

    The condition where governments keep changing, it takes years to implement a single agreement, and competition among political parties affects policy continuity has been viewed by Beijing as a challenge for its development partnership.

    Simkhada’s statement shows that RSP-China relations should not be evaluated solely on the basis of a single visit or meeting. China increasing contact with the new political power may be an adjustment of its diplomatic priorities. However, its actual impact will be determined by how clearly Nepal presents its national interests and how institutionalized it makes the relationship.

    2. Expectations of political stability and a strong government

    Political instability in Nepal is an old concern for China. Beijing has viewed the condition where governments keep changing, it takes years to implement a single agreement, and competition among political parties affects policy continuity as a challenge for its development partnership. It appears that China wants a stable government and long-term policy commitment in Nepal.

    After the RSP secured 182 seats in the House of Representatives, a government with a clear majority of a single party has been formed in Nepal’s parliamentary politics after a long time. This number is two less than the 184 seats required for a two-thirds majority. However, from the perspective of passing ordinary bills and running the government, the RSP’s parliamentary strength is remarkable. China may expect that development projects stalled in the past due to coalition governments and frequent changes in power will now move forward.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP? (5)

    Party Chairman Rabi Lamichhane discussing with RSP MPs visiting China.

    In China’s view, having a stable government does not mean political stability alone. It prepares a predictable environment for the implementation of bilateral agreements, prioritization of projects, security of investment, and long-term economic partnership. Government continuity is important in matters such as agreements under the BRI, operation of border checkpoints, infrastructure construction, and trade expansion.

    The tendency to review every project whenever the government changes without formulating alternative plans weakens development partnership.

    However, obtaining a majority and ensuring policy continuity are not the same thing. The mandate obtained from elections gives the government the right to make decisions, but it does not guarantee that all decisions will automatically be correct. Stability must be linked with democratic accountability, institutional procedures, and public welfare. If the use of majority happens for building national consensus and implementing long-term policies, it can reassure all development partners, including China.

    For Nepal, agreements made not only with China, but also with India, the US, Japan, and European countries require policy continuity. The tendency to review every project whenever the government changes without formulating alternative plans weakens development partnership. The new government can review old agreements, but for that, it must present clear reasons, economic evaluations, and implementation alternatives.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP? (6)

    Prime Minister Balendra Shah discussing with RSP MPs visiting China.

    Former Foreign Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya states that Nepal should not ignore international relations and diplomatic engagement. He says, “Nepal’s international situation, geopolitical positioning, and history have not changed. These realities do not change just because governments change. It is natural for the Prime Minister to emphasize internal priorities, but in the name of that, international relations and diplomatic engagement cannot be ignored. Relations with both India and China must be advanced on the basis of continuous dialogue and trust. If the Prime Minister himself does not engage in contact and dialogue at the international level, Nepal could lose important opportunities. Diplomacy is not merely formal visits; it is also a medium to advance the country’s national interests and economic potentials.”

    Acharya’s statement shows that a balance between internal reforms and external relations is necessary for the new government. Not only foreign partners, but also Nepal’s citizens and economy should reap the benefits of political stability. A stable government does not mean quick decisions alone; it also means the quality, transparency, and implementation capacity of decisions.

    During the visit to China, RSP MPs will learn about the Chinese governance system, development model, and institutional practices. However, China’s political and economic system cannot be implemented in Nepal as it is. Appropriate practices must be chosen according to Nepal’s constitution, multiparty democracy, federal structure, and social diversity. Experience exchange does not mean copying, but learning according to one’s own needs.

    Appropriate practices must be chosen according to Nepal’s constitution, multiparty democracy, federal structure, and social diversity. Experience exchange does not mean copying, but learning according to one’s own needs.

    It is natural for China to want to expand relations with a stable government. However, Nepal should not define stability according to the expectations of any single country. Political stability becomes sustainable only when democratic competition, civil rights, the role of parliament, and independent institutions are strong. If the new government can maintain this balance, a foundation of trust will be prepared not only for relations with China, but for all international partnerships.

    3. Tibet, the One-China policy and security sensitivity

    Tibet is one of the most sensitive aspects of Nepal-China relations. China has always considered Tibet as an inalienable part of its territory and expects that no political activities against China take place from Nepali soil. Nepal has also long expressed its commitment to the One-China policy. However, the presence of Tibetan refugees, religious activities, events connected with the Dalai Lama, and educational and research activities related to Tibet have periodically turned this issue into a diplomatic sensitivity.

    Statistics have frequently cited that there are around 12,540 Tibetan refugees in Nepal. Nepal has not issued new refugee identity cards since 1995. Although religious, cultural, and social activities of the Tibetan community are conducted, Nepal has adopted a policy of not permitting anti-China political demonstrations or activities. Due to Nepal’s geography and security relations with China, Beijing watches this issue with special interest.

    The conference, which was to see the participation of over 700 participants from 39 countries, featured scholars and researchers from around the world studying Tibetan history, language, religion, art, culture, and society.

    During his visit to China on June 15, 2026, Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal had reiterated Nepal’s commitment to the One-China policy. China had also stated that it supports Nepal’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Against such a background, when any international program related to Tibet is organized in Nepal, it is not unnatural for it to create interest at the diplomatic level.

    A recent example of this is the International Tibetan Studies Conference that was prepared to be organized at Kathmandu University. The 17th Conference of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (IATS) was prepared to be organized from August 23 to 29, 2026, in collaboration with Kathmandu University. The conference, which was to see the participation of over 700 participants from 39 countries, featured scholars and researchers from around the world studying Tibetan history, language, religion, art, culture, and society.

    However, it was made public a few weeks before the conference that Kathmandu University was asked not to organize the program. According to the official statement of IATS published on August 8, on August 3, Chief Secretary of the Government of Nepal Govinda Bahadur Karki and Foreign Secretary Amrit Bahadur Rai met Kathmandu University Vice-Chancellor Prof. Dr. Rishikesh Wagle, Registrar Prof. Dr. Rajib Shrestha, and Prof. Dr. Sagar Sharma of the Himalayan Center for Asian Studies and instructed them not to organize the conference. IATS stated that they did not receive any official letter or formal reason for the decision from the government.

    News reports quoting government officials were published stating that the Chinese ambassador had met Nepali officials and requested vigilance, stating that pro-Tibet activities could take place at the conference.

    Different statements were made publicly regarding the government’s directive. The spokesperson of the Prime Minister’s Office claimed that no written or oral directive was given by the government to stop the conference, and the organizers themselves postponed the program. On the other hand, IATS stated that it was confirmed that an oral directive came from government officials and afterward further oral communication instructed not to organize the program. The organizers expressed dissatisfaction, stating that an academic program prepared for three years was halted at the last moment.

    News reports had been published stating that Chinese diplomatic interest and pressure were in the background of the decision to stop the conference. News reports quoting government officials were published stating that the Chinese ambassador had met Nepali officials and requested vigilance, stating that pro-Tibet activities could take place at the conference. However, there is no available public written government record concluding that direct Chinese pressure was the cause of the government’s formal decision. This matter must be viewed by maintaining a clear distinction between allegations and confirmed government decisions.

    IATS decided to organize the conference through online medium after it could not be held physically in Kathmandu. According to the organization, more than 700 participants had already purchased flight tickets and booked hotels. Concerns were also expressed that changing the format of the program after three years of preparation and heavy financial and academic investment would affect Nepal’s international academic reputation.

    Nepal can maintain its commitment not to allow political activities against China from its soil. However, it is not appropriate to automatically interpret academic research concerning Tibetan history, language, culture, and religion as political activities.

    This incident raised questions about the balance between Nepal’s commitment to the One-China policy and academic freedom. Nepal can maintain its commitment not to allow political activities against China from its soil. However, it is not appropriate to automatically interpret academic research concerning Tibetan history, language, culture, and religion as political activities. If there are security sensitivities, they should be addressed on the basis of legal procedures, evidence, and clear standards. Keeping university academic autonomy and international research cooperation in uncertainty is not in long-term interest.

    Another dispute regarding Tibet was connected to the birthday of the Dalai Lama. On July 6, 2026, a celebration of the Dalai Lama’s 91st birthday was organized at the Namgyal School in Nagarjun. Afterward, former Nepali ambassadors issued a joint statement recalling that Nepal has continuously expressed commitment to the One-China policy. Former ambassadors Rajeshwar Acharya, Mahesh Maske, Mahendra Bahadur Pandey, Lila Mani Paudel, Tanka Karki, Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, and Krishna Prasad Oli participated in the statement.

    Their statement said: “Nepal has always firmly adopted the One-China policy, has continuously expressed the commitment that no actions difficult or adversely affecting any friendly nation will be carried or allowed to be carried out from Nepali soil, and that commitment was reiterated even during Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal’s recent visit to China—has that commitment changed? Have we changed our foreign policy toward neighbors?”

    They also warned that such activities could have an adverse impact on Nepal’s geopolitical balance and could be counterproductive to the country’s stability, development, and independence. The statement said: “Since such activities will be counterproductive to our country’s stability, development, and independence, we appeal to the Government of Nepal and all stakeholders to remain vigilant and conscious. Also, we draw the attention of the Government of Nepal to ensure that such activities are not repeated in the future and to remain sensitive in relations with neighbors.”

    China’s security concerns cannot be ignored, but in the name of that, making academic activities, freedom of expression, and legal rights ambiguous is also not appropriate.

    Former ambassador to China Mahendra Bahadur Pandey states that apprehensions generated with China must be transformed into trust through actions. According to him, merely reiterating commitment to the One-China policy is not sufficient; it must also be implemented in practice. He says, “If any apprehensions have arisen with China, they must first be transformed into trust. Nepal must be able to show through practice that it will not allow its soil to be used against any friendly nation and that it is committed to the One-China policy. Trust cannot be built merely by repeating commitments. Some projects that China previously said it would grant have not moved forward because Nepal could not present necessary plans. Reviewing that, stopped works must be advanced. Relations with China should not be limited to political apprehension and distrust; rather, they should be focused on education, technology, agriculture, and economic cooperation.”

    The challenge for Nepal is to maintain a balance between commitment to the One-China policy and its legal and democratic responsibilities. China’s security concerns cannot be ignored, but in the name of that, making academic activities, freedom of expression, and legal rights ambiguous is also not appropriate. While expanding relations with China, the RSP will have to build a clear policy understanding on these matters.

    4. BRI and the implementation of past agreements

    A memorandum of understanding regarding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was signed between Nepal and China in 2017. Since then, discussions have been ongoing between the two countries regarding project selection, financial modalities, and implementation for a long time. Following the signing of the BRI cooperation framework on December 4, 2024, Nepal-China development partnership entered a new phase. However, even long after the agreement was reached, project implementation has not moved forward at the expected pace.

    For China, economic relations with Nepal can be a medium to connect into a long-term structure, expand cross-Himalayan connectivity, and strengthen economic reach with South Asia.

    For Nepal, BRI is an opportunity to expand infrastructure development, commercial connectivity, and access to northern border points. For China, economic relations with Nepal can be a medium to connect into a long-term structure, expand cross-Himalayan connectivity, and strengthen economic reach with South Asia. Therefore, BRI is not just a road or tunnel construction project, but is also connected to China’s regional economic and strategic vision.

    Projects that can be advanced under the BRI include the Tokha-Chhahare tunnel road, Hilsa-Simikot road, and other cross-border infrastructure, which have been viewed with priority. These projects can help improve road connectivity in Nepal’s northern region, expand trade links with China, and increase economic activity in border areas. However, there is a large gap between project potential and implementation capacity.

    The main question for Nepal is whether to build projects under BRI through loans or grants, which financial modality to adopt, and how to ensure returns from them. Entering agreements without objective evaluations of infrastructure construction costs, loan interest rates, repayment periods, post-construction operating expenses, and economic returns can be risky. Nepal must center its debt-carrying capacity and the economic potential of projects.

    Taking loans or accepting projects in the name of BRI is not an achievement in itself. Decisions must be made based on how much the project contributes to production, trade, employment, reduction of transportation costs, and the national economy. Nepal should keep options of grants, concessional loans, commercial loans, and public-private partnerships open. If the financial structure is not transparent, development projects can become a long-term economic burden.

    The fact that Nepal has participated in BRI does not mean it cannot engage in development partnerships with other countries. Nepal’s foreign policy must be based on multilateral cooperation and independent decision-making.

    Projects with India, the US, Japan, the European Union, and other development partners can also be advanced according to national priorities. Cooperation with China should not be used as an alternative to relations with other partners, but as a complementary opportunity.

    Former Foreign Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya has been stating that even if governments change, the country’s international commitments and national needs do not change. The essence of his statement is that development partnerships like the BRI should be viewed separately from the government’s internal political priorities. The new government can review old agreements, but for that, clear reasons and alternative plans are necessary. Only by maintaining a balance between continuity and review can Nepal make relations with China result-oriented.

    If Nepal can make its priorities clear in development partnerships with China, the BRI can become a medium of economic transformation. Otherwise, the old problem of the list of agreements, visits, and announcements increasing without implementation may repeat.

    For the RSP government, the implementation of BRI will be an important test. The new government is not bound to accept old agreements as they are. However, it must conduct an objective review of those agreements and make clear decisions on which projects are in national interest, whose financial structures need revision, and which can be advanced. Both tendencies—leaving agreements in uncertainty due to political changes and accepting projects without examining economic potential—can be harmful.

    5. Pokhara International Airport and security of Chinese investment

    Pokhara International Airport is an important project of economic and infrastructure partnership with China. Even though the airport, built with the involvement of Chinese loans and construction companies, has come into operation, economic, financial, and corruption-related questions connected with it have added a new sensitivity to Nepal-China relations.

    Investigations and legal processes regarding alleged irregularities and corruption in the airport construction process have advanced in Nepal. This matter is not merely an audit of an infrastructure project, but is also connected to foreign loans, procurement processes, construction costs, and public accountability. Advancing corruption investigations impartially is Nepal’s legal obligation. It is not appropriate to stop or weaken investigations merely because a foreign company or country is involved.

    China steps out of quiet diplomacy: Why Beijing is strengthening ties with Nepal’s ruling RSP? (7)

    Pokhara International Airport.

    However, the investigation process must be transparent and evidence-based. The legal rights of Chinese companies, financial institutions, or citizens involved in projects must be protected. If Nepal cannot maintain a balance between investor security and public accountability, uncertainty could arise among future foreign investors. Therefore, it is necessary to bring corruption investigations to a conclusion through legal processes without letting them become a subject of political or diplomatic pressure.

    For China as well, the security of its investments and projects is an important matter. When problems appear in any project, their solution must be sought through institutional dialogue. Nepal must provide legal security to investors, but that does not mean giving immunity to anyone involved in irregularities. The security of Chinese investments and control of corruption are not mutually contradictory subjects. Transparent investigations can strengthen the investment climate in the long run.

    According to details from Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China has made commitments related to 19 projects in Nepal through the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). Details mention that commitments equivalent to a total of USD 1.3 billion exist for those projects and USD 547.1 million equivalent has been disbursed. This shows that China is an important development partner for Nepal. However, the gap between commitments and actual disbursement also points out the necessity to improve project selection, preparation, and implementation capacity.

    It is natural for the RSP to raise the issue of investment security while expanding relations with China. However, Nepal must also clearly maintain the independence of its legal system and investigation process. The most reliable measure to maintain investor confidence is the rule of law, transparency, and equal treatment. Applying equal rules for everyone rather than giving special facilities to investors of any single country is in Nepal’s long-term interest.

    6. Balancing American influence and China’s strategic competition

    Another reason for China’s growing interest in Nepal is the global strategic competition between the United States and China. In recent years, American activism has increased in South Asia. The United States has been expanding its relations with Nepal through development assistance, infrastructure, democracy, good governance, technology, security, and regional cooperation. China tends to view this as growing American influence in its neighborhood.

    Although Nepal is geographically situated between India and China, its international relations are not limited to just two neighbors. The United States is an old development partner of Nepal. American assistance has continuously existed in the fields of education, health, infrastructure, disaster management, democratic institutions, and economic development. Nepal should not understand its relationship with the United States as an alternative to its relationship with China. Both countries have their own areas and possibilities for cooperation.

    Development projects, technology selection, communication infrastructure, energy, digital systems, and even security cooperation can become subjects of geopolitical competition.

    However, when competition between the US and China intensifies, strategic pressure on small countries like Nepal can increase. Cooperation with one major power can become linked with the security or influence concerns of the other. Development projects, technology selection, communication infrastructure, energy, digital systems, and even security cooperation can become subjects of geopolitical competition. In such a situation, Nepal must keep its priorities and decision-making process clear.

    For China, expanding relations with the RSP is also an opportunity to understand the new government’s foreign policy. What kind of relations the new ruling party seeks to maintain with the US, India, and China, which development partnerships it prioritizes, and what views it holds on strategic matters can be important for Beijing. It is natural for China to reassess the status of its influence and access after a new political power reaches power in Nepal.

    When expanding relations with China, the RSP government should not adopt a policy of weakening American cooperation or evaluating relations with the US solely from China’s perspective. Likewise, while expanding American cooperation, ignoring China’s security concerns and geographical relationship with Nepal is also not appropriate. Nepal must evaluate its relations with all partners from the single criterion of national interest.

    Advancing relations with India, China, the US, or any other country at the expense of relations with another country is not in Nepal’s interest. Nepal’s diplomatic diversification is an important opportunity to protect national interest and mobilize available re

    Former ambassador and foreign affairs expert Dr. Dinesh Bhattarai states that Nepal should not conduct its foreign policy limited to the influence or interest of any single major power. He says, “Nepal should not limit its foreign policy to the influence or interest of any single major power. At a time when competition between the US and China is affecting the world order itself, Nepal must expand its diplomatic relations by centering its national interest. Relations with China are an important foundation of Nepal’s independent foreign policy. Advancing relations with India, China, the US, or any other country at the price of relations with another country is not in Nepal’s interest. Nepal’s diplomatic diversification itself is an important opportunity to protect national interest and mobilize available resources for development.”

    Bhattarai’s statement shows that Nepal must turn strategic competition into an opportunity for its development. Technology, education, and development cooperation can be done with the US. Partnerships in infrastructure, trade, industry, and technology can be expanded with China. Economic and social relations with India can be further strengthened. There are also opportunities for cooperation with Japan, South Korea, the European Union, and other partners. Operating relations with everyone according to national necessities rather than limiting oneself to the influence of any single partner is diplomatic diversification.

    If the new government can select partnerships by keeping national interests clear, expanding relations with China will not have a negative impact on relations with other countries.

    Nepal must not let its geography become a playground for the competition of major powers. However, in the name of staying away from competition, it must not lose opportunities for development and international cooperation either. If the new government can select partnerships by keeping national interests clear, expanding relations with China will not have a negative impact on relations with other countries.

    7. Competition with India and expanding influence in border areas

    China’s growing activity in Nepal cannot be viewed separately from its competition with India. India is Nepal’s closest and deepest neighbor with economic, social, and cultural ties. Due to open borders, trade, transit, employment, energy, education, and people-to-people relations, Nepal’s economy and daily life are directly connected with India. This reality does not change when expanding relations with China.

    In recent years, China has been prioritizing subjects of road, rail, trade checkpoints, energy, and border development for expanding contact with Nepal. Nepal is in an important geographical position in China’s strategy to connect Nepal with South Asia and expand cross-Himalayan connectivity. The economic and strategic competition between India and China has made this exact position of Nepal even more sensitive.

    Nepal’s geographical positioning and economic structure show the necessity of maintaining balanced relations with both neighbors.

    It is natural for Nepal to want to open northern checkpoints, road infrastructure, and expand trade connectivity with China. However, due to the geographical difficulties, weather, snowfall, and landslides of northern routes, making those routes a complete alternative to supply routes with India is immediately not possible. Nepal’s geographical positioning and economic structure show the necessity of maintaining balanced relations with both neighbors.

    India has also been heavily investing in development cooperation and infrastructure construction in Nepal. According to details from the Indian Embassy, since 2003, 546 projects have been advanced in Nepal under the High Impact Community Development Project (HICDP). Among them, 483 projects have been completed, while 63 projects are in the process of implementation. Indian cooperation has expanded in the fields of education, health, drinking water, roads, and community infrastructure.

    Rather than making any single checkpoint an alternative to another, facilitating trade, transit, and movement from both directions is in Nepal’s interest.

    China is also seeking to expand development cooperation, infrastructure, and trade connectivity in border areas. This can be understood as an aspect of competition with India. However, for both northern and southern connectivity routes, they are economic potentials for Nepal. Rather than making any single checkpoint an alternative to another, facilitating trade, transit, and movement from both directions is in Nepal’s interest.

    Border-related matters have also made Nepal-India-China relations sensitive. Nepal’s claims regarding Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura are subjects that must be continuously raised diplomatically based on historical facts and evidence. Presenting such matters differently according to the convenience of ruling and opposition parties weakens the national stance. While maintaining relations with both China and India, Nepal’s stance regarding its borders and sovereignty must be kept clear.

    Former Ambassador to India Nilamber Acharya states that Nepal must prioritize its relations with neighbors. He says, “Nepal is in an extremely sensitive geographical region. On one side is China and on the other is India; both are rapidly developing neighbors. Therefore, relations with these two countries must be prioritized. Expanding relations with other countries of the world is equally necessary, but a policy of alienating neighbors to please distant friends is not appropriate. If China has apprehensions that Nepal is ignoring it, the government must address them seriously. Such apprehensions must not be allowed to affect national interest. Building a relationship of trust with neighbors while maintaining the right to make independent decisions is Nepal’s responsibility.”

    In diplomatic relations, spoken words have both meaning and impact. Nepal must also understand geographical difficulties towards the north.

    Former Ambassador and Diplomat Deep Kumar Upadhyay also states that restraint and self-discipline are necessary in diplomatic behavior. He says, “Relations with Nepal’s two large neighbors must be viewed from the perspective of national interest. Self-discipline, propriety, and restraint are necessary in diplomacy. From the Prime Minister down to ministers, extreme caution must be adopted while giving public expressions. In diplomatic relations, spoken words have both meaning and impact. Nepal must also understand geographical difficulties towards the north. Conditions of snowfall in winter and landslides in the rainy season make it difficult to make northern routes the sole reliable supply route. Therefore, relations with neighbors should be conducted based on practical national interest rather than emotional reactions.”

    Former Ambassador to China Tanka Karki states that party-based double standards must not be adopted regarding Nepal’s sovereignty and national interest. He says, “Nepal must maintain a clear stance on matters of its sovereignty and national interest. Nepal’s claims on matters like Lipulekh, Kalapani, and Limpiyadhura must be based on historical facts and evidence. Raising such matters differently according to the convenience of ruling and opposition parties in government is not appropriate. The trend of remaining silent while in government and making fiery expressions while in opposition weakens the national stance. Diplomatic initiatives regarding Nepal’s land and border matters must be continuous. Presenting one’s claim clearly and with evidence while maintaining relations with neighbors is what serves Nepal’s interest.”

    If infrastructure construction is carried out without paying attention to traditional trade, animal husbandry, cultural relations, and local movement, its benefits can remain limited.

    These statements show that Nepal should prioritize its own national interests rather than becoming a strategic partner of any single side in the competition between China and India. While constructing roads, trade centers, and infrastructure in border areas, the living standards of local residents must be improved. Projects that facilitate markets for local products, employment, health, education, and movement are the ones that become useful in the long run.

    For Nepal, northern checkpoints are not just a matter of geopolitical connectivity, but are also linked to the livelihood of border communities. If infrastructure is constructed without paying attention to traditional trade, animal husbandry, cultural relations, and local movement, its benefits can remain limited. While expanding relations with China, the interests of local communities must also be placed as a national priority.

    8. Soft power expansion andrelations with the New Political Generation

    China has not limited its relations with Nepal to the government-to-government level alone. It has been trying to expand contact down to political parties, universities, students, cultural institutions, media, and local levels. This can be understood as an aspect of China’s soft power expansion. Developing relations with the new generation through development experience, education, scholarships, language, culture, and technology can be Beijing’s long-term strategic interest.

    China’s relations with Nepal’s political parties have long been based on party-to-party contacts. Contact expansion that started with communist parties had reached the Nepali Congress and other parties. Now that the RSP has reached the center of power, China has found an opportunity to develop relations with the new political generation.

    The itinerary of the visit to China includes observations of industrial zones, high-tech enterprises, the CPC’s party school, and post-earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan province.

    The political foundation of the RSP is different from traditional parties. Rising from the new generation, social media, alternative political narratives, and slogans of good governance, this party is leading the government. For China, this is an opportunity to understand the thinking, foreign policy perspective, and development priorities of this new political power. For the RSP, it is also an opportunity to take information about China’s economic development, technology, public services, and institutional practices.

    The itinerary of the visit to China includes observations of industrial zones, high-tech enterprises, the CPC’s party school, and post-earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan province. The delegation is scheduled to visit various locations in Beijing, Hangzhou, and Sichuan to get information about practices in development, technology, administration, and disaster management. The visit is stated to last for 11 days.

    China can utilize this visit as an opportunity to develop institutional relations with the RSP’s parliamentary leadership. The RSP also gets an opportunity to understand China’s political system and development experience. However, experiences gained from study visits must be utilized only by blending them with Nepal’s constitution, political system, economic capacity, and social structure.

    Nepali students and researchers can benefit from China’s experiences regarding science, technology, industry, and management. However, such cooperation must be transparent and institutional.

    For Nepal, cooperation with China is also an area that can be expanded into education, research, and technology. Partnerships can be done in inter-university cooperation, research exchanges, scholarships, technical training, and innovation. Nepali students and researchers can benefit from China’s experiences regarding science, technology, industry, and management. However, such cooperation must be transparent and institutional. The autonomy of universities and the freedom of research must remain protected.

    Climate change and the Himalayan environment can also become a new diplomatic priority in relations with China. Nepal is a country at high risk from the effects of climate change. Melting glaciers, risks of glacial lake outbursts, floods and landslides, erratic rainfall, and temperature rises are affecting Himalayan communities, water resources, agriculture, and infrastructure. Since both China and India are countries connected to the Himalayas, there are possibilities for cooperation in Himalayan climate research, meteorological information exchange, and disaster management.

    Former Ambassador to China Bishnu Pukar Shrestha states that Nepal’s diplomatic priorities should not be limited to traditional security, trade, and political relations alone. He says, “Nepal must not limit its foreign policy to traditional political relations, security, and trade alone.”

    Climate change is currently not limited to environmental crisis alone; it has also become a subject of human rights, development, economic security, and international diplomacy. Even though Nepal contributes extremely minimally to global greenhouse gas emissions, it falls among countries most affected by climate change’s impacts. In such a situation, Nepal must not present itself merely as a country receiving international assistance.

    The sensitivity of the Himalayas, climate risks, and its geographical identity must be utilized as an opportunity to expand diplomatic influence. Cooperation must be expanded with countries connected to the Himalayan region, including China and India, in glacier monitoring, meteorological information, early warning systems, disaster management, and conservation of transboundary water res foreign policy

    Party-based dialogue can be useful, but state policy must be directed by institutions of the constitution, parliament, and government.

    Although cultural and educational contacts are useful in expanding relations with China, they cannot be placed above the state’s policy autonomy. Relations with any foreign party must not influence Nepal’s internal political competition or the government’s decision-making process. Party-based dialogue can be useful, but state policy must be directed by institutions of the constitution, parliament, and government.

    Rather than making relations with China a subject of political propaganda, the RSP should connect it with the agenda of national development. Only if contact with the new generation, cooperation in education and technology, and institutional experience exchanges are connected to concrete programs will soft power relations be useful in Nepal’s interest.

    9. Trade, transit, and trans-Himalayan connectivity

    Another major reason for expanding relations with China is trade, transit, and trans-Himalayan connectivity. China is Nepal’s second-largest trading partner. However, Nepal’s deficit in trade between the two countries is extremely high. While Nepal imports large quantities of goods from China, its exports towards China are comparatively very low.

    According to data from Nepal Rastra Bank for the fiscal year 2024/25, Nepal’s total trade with China reached Rs 343.73 billion. Among that, the trade deficit stood at Rs 338.47 billion. This data shows that even though trade with China has expanded, Nepal has not been able to take equal benefits from it.

    The operation of northern checkpoints is also important in Nepal’s trade with China. Effective operation of Tatopani, Rasuwagadhi, Kerung, Hilsa, and other border routes can help reduce trade costs and diversify the supply system.

    Nepal must connect its relations with China to reducing the trade deficit and expanding exports. Access for Nepali agricultural products, herbs, handicrafts, processed food products, minerals, and other potential items can be expanded into the Chinese market. However, for that, quality verification, customs procedures, transportation, market information, and trade agreements are necessary. The matter of market access cannot be resolved merely through political meetings. Continuous work must be done at technical and administrative levels.

    The operation of northern checkpoints is also important in Nepal’s trade with China. Effective operation of Tatopani, Rasuwagadhi, Kerung, Hilsa, and other border routes can help reduce trade costs and diversify the supply system. However, due to geographical difficulties, weather, road conditions, and border management, problems have been seen in the utilization of northern checkpoints. Cooperation between both countries is necessary to make checkpoint operations regular, predictable, and trade-friendly.

    Nepal must also build a long-term perspective regarding transit and transport cooperation with China. A transit agreement was made with China with the objective of reducing dependence on India for access to the sea. However, making an agreement and making its practical utilization possible are different things. Without testing distance, cost, geographical conditions, transportation time, and the availability of infrastructure, transit alternatives cannot become effective.

    The matter that Nepal must prioritize strategic infrastructure such as four north-south corridors and two power transmission lines has been raised for a long time.

    If MPs visiting China can prioritize subjects of trade barriers, transit costs, and border infrastructure, it can bring direct economic achievements to the visit. Otherwise, discussions of expanding trade relations will remain limited to import statistics.

    Another aspect of connecting contact expansion with China to infrastructure and regional development is cross-border road and rail networks. The matter that Nepal must prioritize strategic infrastructure such as four north-south corridors and two power transmission lines has been raised for a long time. Such infrastructure can give opportunities to connect Nepal’s northern regions with the national market, increase border trade, and expand possibilities for energy exchange.

    However, constructing infrastructure in Himalayan regions has both high costs and high risks. A detailed assessment of geological conditions, landslides, snowfall, river systems, wildlife, and impacts on local settlements is necessary. When deciding to construct roads or tunnels, long-term economic returns and environmental impacts must be prioritized over immediate political gains.

    Nepal can learn appropriate technology and management methods from China’s agricultural development experience. However, agricultural cooperation should not be limited only to purchasing imported machinery.

    Nepal can also connect agriculture, tourism, energy, and industry in cooperation with China. In the agricultural sector, technology and investment can be utilized in mechanization, seed technology, irrigation, storage, cold chains, processing, and market management. Infrastructure is necessary to bring fruits, herbs, and other agricultural yields produced in hilly and Himalayan regions to markets. Nepal can learn appropriate technology and management methods from China’s agricultural development experience. However, agricultural cooperation should not be limited only to purchasing imported machinery. Technology must be selected according to the capacity of local farmers, soil and climate conditions, and market demand.

    Tourism is another potential sector. Air connectivity, promotion, service quality, and tourism infrastructure can be improved to increase the number of tourists coming to Nepal from China. Nepal’s mountains, cultural heritage, religious sites, and adventure tourism can be attractive for the Chinese market. However, along with the goal of increasing tourist arrivals, attention must also be paid to environmental conservation of tourist destinations, local community participation, and service quality. When conducting tourism cooperation with China, arrangements are necessary where Nepali tourism business owners and local entrepreneurs receive direct benefits.

    It is not enough to just increase electricity generation; transmission infrastructure connecting it to internal consumption and export markets is also necessary.

    Possibilities for cooperation exist in the energy sector as well. Although Nepal has potential capacity for hydropower generation, transmission lines, market access, and investment management remain challenges. Cooperation can be done with China in energy infrastructure, transmission technology, and hydropower projects. However, the financial structures, environmental impacts, and market certainty of energy projects must be tested. It is not enough to just increase electricity generation; transmission infrastructure connecting it to internal consumption and export markets is also necessary.

    Nepal must also prioritize industrial development in relations with China. The contribution of manufacturing industries in Nepal is comparatively weak. Technology, capital, skills, and markets are necessary to make an import-dependent economy into a production- and export-oriented one. While making joint investments with Chinese companies, the skill development of Nepali workers, technology transfer, and the creation of local production chains can be made part of agreements. When foreign companies establish industries in Nepal, the benefits of investment become broad only if local suppliers, technical manpower, and small businesses are connected.

    Former Ambassador to China Krishna Prasad Oli states that Nepal must prioritize policy stability and strategic infrastructure. He says, “Relations between Nepal and China must be advanced on the basis of trust, stability, and long-term cooperation. Political and policy stability are extremely important in relations with China. When governments and policies change frequently in Nepal, problems have occurred in implementing past agreements and accords. Now, strategic infrastructure such as four north-south corridors and two power transmission lines must be prioritized. If Nepal cannot make China confident about its political, policy, and economic stability, building expected trust in bilateral cooperation will be difficult.”

    Infrastructure construction must strengthen the local economy. While constructing roads or trade centers in border areas, long-term benefits are obtained only if they are connected to markets for local products, employment, and service facilities.

    Oli’s statement shows that relations with China must be connected to long-term infrastructure and policy continuity. However, testing financial structures, environmental impacts, market access, and operational capacity in infrastructure construction is equally necessary. Providing legal security to investors is necessary, but that does not mean weakening labor rights, environmental standards, or public welfare. Nepal must apply equal, transparent, and predictable rules for all foreign investors.

    Another important duty of Nepal in relations with China is protecting the interests of border communities. Expanding northern checkpoints and trade infrastructure can affect the movement, traditional trade, animal husbandry, and cultural relations of local residents. Infrastructure construction must strengthen the local economy. While constructing roads or trade centers in border areas, long-term benefits are obtained only if they are connected to markets for local products, employment, and service facilities.

    Nepal has its own potentials in hydropower, tourism, agriculture, biodiversity, Himalayan knowledge, and regional connectivity. Those potentials can be connected to China’s market, technology, and capital. Presenting Nepal merely as a country needing investment and assistance is not sufficient. The basis of cooperation must be mutual benefit.

    10. Diplomatic balance, national interests and strategic autonomy

    Expanding the Rastriya Swatantra Party’s (RSP) relations with China should not be understood merely as a matter of bilateral political engagement. It will also test Nepal’s overall foreign policy, strategic autonomy and capacity to make independent national decisions. Nepal is geographically situated between two major powers. It has historical, economic, social and security relations with both India and China. In addition, Nepal has expanded its development partnerships and diplomatic relations with the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and other countries.

    The United States may raise issues relating to democracy, development, technology and regional cooperation. Nepal should listen to all these concerns but make its decisions based on its own national needs.

    Nepal’s foreign policy cannot be confined to the influence or interests of any single power. Its relations must be conducted on the basis of the Constitution, national interests, sovereignty and independent decision-making capacity. Relations with China are important, but they cannot be made an alternative to relations with India. Likewise, limiting development and trade opportunities with China because of close relations with India would not serve Nepal’s interests.

    The challenge for the new government is to maintain trust with all its partners. China may raise its security concerns and development priorities. India may express its concerns based on its geographical and economic ties with Nepal. The United States may raise issues relating to democracy, development, technology and regional cooperation. Nepal should listen to all these concerns but make its decisions based on its own national needs.

    Political scientist and former ambassador to India Lok Raj Baral says that any assessment of whether Nepal’s foreign policy has changed must distinguish between fundamental principles and the political practices of the time. He says, “When assessing whether Nepal’s foreign policy has changed, fundamental principles must be distinguished from the political practices of the time. The current global situation is disorderly and competitive.

    The foundations of foreign policy should not change with a change of government. However, the way relations are conducted can be adjusted according to international circumstances and national needs. The new government must understand this distinction.

    Even powerful countries are concerned about their security and expanding their influence. In such circumstances, Nepal should not adopt a policy of becoming excessively close to one power or creating unnecessary distance from another. Relations with neighbours should move forward on the basis of trust and objectivity. Strengthening domestic stability, development and the institutional capacity of the state is equally necessary before expanding external relations.”

    Baral’s remarks indicate that Nepal’s foreign policy must maintain both continuity and the necessary flexibility in practice. Its foundations should not change with a change of government. However, the way relations are conducted can be adjusted according to international circumstances and national needs. The new government must understand this distinction.

    Mahesh Maskey, former ambassador to China, says climate justice should be advanced as a matter of Nepal’s rights and a diplomatic priority. He says, “When raising the issue of climate justice on international platforms, Nepal should not present it merely as a matter of seeking assistance. It is a question of Nepal’s rights and justice. However, while presenting its demands to the international community, Nepal must also strengthen its domestic preparedness, good governance and disaster management capacity. During disasters, Nepal must be able to obtain available technical assistance from neighbouring countries in a timely manner. Our weakness lies in being unable to utilise the necessary technology and human resources for rescue and relief even when they are available. Cooperation with both China and India should be advanced in a way that is linked to Nepal’s national needs and the protection of people’s lives.”

    A weak economy, weak administration and policy instability increase the risk of external pressure. State institutions must be strengthened to enhance the country’s capacity to make its own decisions.

    Maintaining Nepal’s strategic autonomy requires more than external relations. Domestic political stability, economic capacity, institutional efficiency and national unity are equally important. A weak economy, weak administration and policy instability increase the risk of external pressure. State institutions must be strengthened to enhance the country’s capacity to make its own decisions.

    There is a need to expand subject-specific expertise, research and policy analysis capacity within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Parliament must effectively monitor international agreements, foreign assistance and investment. Independent technical and economic studies should be prioritised when evaluating foreign aid and investment projects. Making public information available about project costs, loan conditions, returns and risks would also increase public trust.

    Nepal must not allow its geography to become a strategic battleground for competing powers. When relations between India and China fluctuate, Nepal may experience direct consequences. As competition between the United States and China intensifies, Nepal may face additional pressure over development assistance and technology choices. In such circumstances, Nepal’s greatest security shield is its own national unity, economic capacity, political stability and diplomatic maturity.

    Expanding relations with a new political party is not, in itself, an achievement for Nepal. It will become an achievement only when Nepal gains opportunities through those relations to increase trade, create employment, bring in technology, build infrastructure and strengthen its diplomatic autonomy.

    The rise of the RSP has changed Nepal’s traditional political equations. China also appears to be adjusting its contacts and priorities accordingly. However, expanding relations with a new political party is not, in itself, an achievement for Nepal. It will become an achievement only when Nepal gains opportunities through those relations to increase trade, create employment, bring in technology, build infrastructure and strengthen its diplomatic autonomy.

    The China visit is one of the first important opportunities for the RSP to demonstrate its political and diplomatic maturity. Consultations with party chairman Rabi Lamichhane reflect the interest of the political leadership. Prime Minister Balen Shah’s instructions seek to link the visit with economic and development priorities. The delegation must now clearly present Nepal’s national interests in China. An environment must also be created to publicly assess the outcomes of the visit after the delegation returns.

    The timing of the China visit is also significant. A new political force has come to power in Nepal, and the government is at a stage of establishing its priorities and working style. China’s invitation to a parliamentary delegation at such a time provides an opportunity to develop an initial understanding with the new leadership. Beijing can gain an understanding of the RSP’s political thinking, development priorities and perspectives on foreign policy. The RSP, in turn, gets an opportunity to understand China’s economic and political priorities, its expectations of Nepal and the possibilities for cooperation.

    For Nepal, relations with China should not depend on any single political party or leader. Institutionalising state-to-state relations can ensure continuity in cooperation even when governments change.

    Limiting this relationship to political party-level closeness would not be useful for either side. Nepal has a political history of frequent changes in government. A party in power today may be in the opposition tomorrow. Therefore, even as China increases its engagement with the RSP, it is necessary to maintain relations with other political parties and institutions in Nepal. For Nepal, too, relations with China should not depend on any single political party or leader. Institutionalising state-to-state relations can ensure continuity in cooperation even when governments change.

    The history of China’s political engagement in Nepal also demonstrates this need. After the end of the monarchy, China prioritised expanding relations with communist parties. It subsequently increased its engagement with other political forces, including the Nepali Congress. Now that the RSP has moved to the centre of power, China’s attention appears to have shifted in that direction. This sequence indicates that Beijing has been expanding its network of contacts in line with political changes in Nepal. However, before considering closeness with any political party a lasting strategic partnership, its long-term conduct and outcomes must be examined.

    It is necessary to present the issues raised during the visit in Parliament, assign the relevant ministries responsibility for implementation and make progress reports publicly available.

    Nepal must maintain trust and transparency as the most important aspects of its relations with China. China may clearly communicate its security concerns to Nepal. Nepal, too, must clearly state its development needs, economic capacity and position on sovereignty-related issues. The relationship can become sustainable only if a balance is maintained between commitment to the One China Policy, the legal rights of the Tibetan community, the security of foreign investment and public accountability.

    The RSP government should treat the China visit as a test of its commitment to national interests. It is necessary to present the issues raised during the visit in Parliament, assign the relevant ministries responsibility for implementation and make progress reports publicly available. This will prevent the visit from being confined to a party-level achievement. If a new phase in relations with China has begun, its benefits must also be institutional and national.

    While observing industrial zones, technology companies and public service systems during the visit, lawmakers can identify practices that could be applied in Nepal. They may gain useful experience in the use of technology in agricultural production, productivity in small industries, digital payments, service delivery by local governments and tourism management. However, the relevant ministries and agencies must prepare studies and action plans after the visit. Results will become visible only if the knowledge gained from the visit is linked to policies, budgets and programmes.

    Environmental impact assessments and risk management arrangements must be effective before projects are approved. Undermining natural relopment goes against long-term national interests

    Nepal must also prioritise environmental concerns in its cooperation with China. When constructing roads, tunnels, hydropower projects and other infrastructure in the Himalayan region, it is necessary to assess geological risks and the impact on wildlife, water resources and local settlements. The costs and risks of construction in high Himalayan areas differ from those in ordinary geographical terrain. Environmental impact assessments and risk management arrangements must be effective before projects are approved. Undermining natural resources and the interests of local communities in the name of development goes against long-term national interests.

    While creating an investment-friendly environment, Nepal must bring clarity to land acquisition, taxation, approval procedures, electricity supply, labour management and dispute resolution. Investors must receive legal protection, but that should not mean weakening workers’ rights, environmental standards or public interests. It would not be appropriate to establish separate rules for Chinese investors and different arrangements for other partners. Equal, transparent and predictable rules must apply to everyone.

    There are opportunities for cooperation with China in Nepal’s agriculture, tourism, energy and industries. However, Nepal’s own capacity must also be strengthened to translate these opportunities into practice. Agricultural production requires technology and markets to grow. Expanding tourism requires air connectivity, service quality and infrastructure. Increasing energy production requires transmission lines and assured markets. When establishing industries, priority should be given to technology transfer, skills development among Nepali workers and the creation of local supply chains.

    The foundation of cooperation must be mutual benefit. Relations will be useful in the long term if an environment is created in which Nepal clearly states its needs and China respects Nepal’s sovereignty and independent decision-making capacity.

    It is not enough to present Nepal merely as a country in need of investment and assistance. Nepal has its own potential in hydropower, tourism, agriculture, biodiversity, Himalayan knowledge and regional connectivity. These opportunities can be linked with China’s markets, technology and capital. The foundation of cooperation must be mutual benefit. Relations will be useful in the long term if an environment is created in which Nepal clearly states its needs and China respects Nepal’s sovereignty and independent decision-making capacity.

    Following the RSP’s visit to China, the government should make the outcomes and implementation status public. There is a need for arrangements to present the visit’s report in Parliament, assign responsibilities to the relevant ministries, conduct economic and technical assessments of proposed projects and cooperation initiatives, and publish progress within a specified timeframe. This would prevent the visit from becoming a subject of party propaganda and turn it into an institutional asset of the state.

    China’s attempt to expand relations with the new government is a natural diplomatic move. Nepal, too, should expand relations with all partners in accordance with its national interests. However, diplomatic closeness cannot be measured solely by the number of meetings, the grandeur of visits or the language used in joint statements. Its real measure lies in the economic opportunities available to Nepali people, safe infrastructure, trade benefits, institutional capacity and the protection of national independence.

    A new political force has come to power, but Nepal’s geography, neighbours and national interests remain the same. Governments and political leadership can change.

    Ultimately, China’s expansion of relations with the RSP signals its changing diplomatic priorities. Nepal can use this as an opportunity, but it should not allow that relationship to determine the foundations of its foreign policy. The ability to bring relations with China, India, the United States and other partners within a single framework of national interests will be the new government’s real diplomatic achievement.

    A new political force has come to power, but Nepal’s geography, neighbours and national interests remain the same. Governments and political leadership can change. International circumstances may also change. However, Nepal’s sovereignty, economic needs and the foundations of its independent foreign policy must not change. Only by keeping its longstanding national interests at the centre while expanding relations with China can Beijing’s growing engagement with the RSP become a useful diplomatic opportunity for Nepal.

    New relations, old national interests

    There is no single reason behind China’s expansion of relations with the RSP. Its major dimensions include gaining access to Nepal’s changed political power structure, exploring the possibility of long-term cooperation with a stable government, clarifying its security concerns regarding the One China Policy and Tibet, advancing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, securing the investment environment and maintaining its diplomatic presence amid regional competition with the United States and India. Expanding relations in education, technology, culture, trade and with the new political generation is also part of this strategic process.

    It is not possible to fully determine which of these issues is China’s highest priority based solely on the official agenda of the visit and public statements. China may not openly present all its diplomatic objectives on every issue. Therefore, rather than describing its expansion of relations with the RSP as the outcome of a single strategic plan, it is more appropriate to understand it as China adjusting the scope of its engagement and cooperation in response to changing political circumstances.

    There may be pressure to make relations with China an alternative to relations with India and the United States or to make Nepal take sides in competition between major powers. Nepal’s diplomatic capacity depends on its ability to safeguard national interests amid these potential pressures.

    For Nepal, expanding relations with China presents both opportunities and challenges. There are opportunities for greater cooperation in infrastructure, technology, trade, agriculture, tourism, education and disaster management. On the other hand, there may be pressure to make relations with China an alternative to relations with India and the United States or to make Nepal take sides in competition between major powers. Nepal’s diplomatic capacity depends on its ability to safeguard national interests amid these potential pressures.

    The RSP must use the public mandate it received through the election in a mature manner in the conduct of foreign policy as well. It must learn from the mistakes and achievements of older political parties in foreign policy. It should not repeat the tendency of showing closeness to one neighbour and distancing itself from another for political gain. Foreign policy must be based on permanent national interests. Its fundamental direction should not change with a change of government.

    China is an important neighbour and development partner for Nepal. Relations with India are also deeply connected to Nepal’s economy, social structure and everyday life. Relations with the United States and other international partners provide opportunities for development, technology and expanding global connectivity. Instead of making these relationships competitors of one another, Nepal must be able to make them complementary to its development strategy. For this, the government’s decision-making capacity, the institutional role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and parliamentary oversight must be effective.

    The achievements of political meetings will remain limited if the issues raised during the visit cannot be advanced institutionally. Nepal can gain concrete benefits from expanding relations only if it clearly identifies its needs and puts forward proposals.

    Nepal has several priorities that it must clearly raise in its relations with China. First, reducing the trade deficit and expanding market access for Nepali goods and services. Second, ensuring transparency in the financial terms, costs and returns of projects, including those under the BRI. Third, making the expansion of northern border crossings and trans-Himalayan connectivity practical and economically viable. Fourth, maintaining a clear balance between Nepal’s commitments and legal obligations regarding sensitive issues related to Tibet and the One China Policy. Fifth, ensuring the security of Chinese investments and citizens while conducting impartial investigations into corruption and irregularities. Sixth, increasing cooperation in climate change, disaster management and Himalayan research.

    These priorities are not limited to the responsibilities of lawmakers travelling to China. They are issues that the government, Parliament, private sector, universities, local governments and diplomatic institutions must pursue through coordination. The achievements of political meetings will remain limited if the issues raised during the visit cannot be advanced institutionally. Nepal can gain concrete benefits from expanding relations only if it clearly identifies its needs and puts forward proposals.

    To build trust in relations with China, Nepal must implement its commitments in practice. However, that does not mean accepting all of China’s expectations. Nepal must cooperate while protecting its sovereignty, independent decision-making capacity and democratic institutions. Similarly, China must respect Nepal as a sovereign partner capable of making independent decisions. Relations between the two sides must be based on mutual respect, equal benefits and clearly defined national interests.

    Specialised human ressary within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Discussions and oversight concerning international relations in Parliament must be effective

    Nepal must strengthen its domestic institutional capacity to maintain balance in its foreign policy. A stable government is a positive aspect, but stability cannot be sustained in the long term unless state institutions are strong. Specialised human resources, research capacity and policy analysis mechanisms are necessary within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Discussions and oversight concerning international relations in Parliament must be effective. Independent technical and economic studies should be prioritised when evaluating foreign aid and investment projects.

    Prime Minister Balen Shah’s instructions seek to link the visit with economic and development priorities. The delegation must now clearly present Nepal’s national interests in China.

    Prime Minister Balen Shah. File photo

    China may see an opportunity to establish long-term engagement with Nepal’s new political generation by expanding relations with the RSP. However, the RSP must also clearly maintain its political identity and national policy autonomy. Relations with any foreign political party must not be allowed to influence Nepal’s domestic political competition or the government’s decision-making process. Party-level dialogue can be useful, but state policy must be guided by the Constitution, Parliament and the institutional processes of the government.

    The government may be new, the political leadership may be new and international circumstances may also change. However, Nepal’s geographical realities, sovereignty, economic needs and the foundations of its independent foreign policy must not change.

    China’s expansion of relations with the RSP is a natural diplomatic move. Nepal, too, should expand relations with all partners in accordance with its national interests. However, diplomatic closeness cannot be measured solely by the number of meetings, the grandeur of visits or the language used in joint statements. Its real measure lies in the economic opportunities available to Nepali people, safe infrastructure, trade benefits, institutional capacity and the protection of national independence.

    Nepal must not forget its longstanding national interests while building new relations with China. The government may be new, the political leadership may be new and international circumstances may also change. However, Nepal’s geographical realities, sovereignty, economic needs and the foundations of its independent foreign policy must not change. Only if relations with China move forward on this basis can Beijing’s growing engagement with the RSP become a useful diplomatic opportunity for Nepal.

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